Abdüksiyon, En İyi Açıklamaya Çıkarım ve Epistemik Rasyonalite

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Year-Number: 2022-12:2
Language : null
Konu : Epistemoloji, Bilim Felsefesi
Number of pages: 537-553
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Abstract

Abdüksiyon ve en iyi açıklamaya çıkarım terimleri sıklıkla aynı akıl yürütme türü olarak ifade edilir. Fakat, yakın zamanlarda bunun bir hata olduğu iddia edilmektedir. Peirce’ün ileri sürdüğü abdüktif çıkarım beklenmeyen gözlemler karşısında yeni bir fikir üretmekle ilgiliyken, en iyi açıklamaya çıkarım ise hangi hipotezin en makul olduğunu belirlemekle ilgilidir. Bu çalışmada, iki çıkarım türü arasındaki fark epistemik rasyonalite üzerinden gösterilecektir. Epistemik rasyonalite bakımından, delil ve inanç arasında güçlü bir ilişki gereklidir. Bu açıdan incelendiğinde, abdüktif çıkarımın delilsel desteği zayıftır, ama bu sayede delillerinin ötesine genişleyerek hipotez yaratma olanağına sahip olmaktadır. En iyi açıklamaya çıkarım ise güçlü bir delilsel desteğe sahip olmadan meşrulaştırılamaz.

Keywords

Abstract

The terms abduction and inference to the best explanation are often referred to as the same type of reasoning. However, it has recently been claimed that this was a mistake. While the abductive inference proposed by Peirce is about generating a new idea in the face of unexpected observations, inference to the best explanation is about determining which hypothesis is the most plausible. In this study, the difference between the two types of inference will be shown through epistemic rationality. In terms of epistemic rationality, a strong relationship between evidence and belief is necessary. From this point of view, the evidential support of abductive inference is weak, but it thus has the opportunity to expand beyond its evidence and create hypotheses. Inference to the best explanation, cannot be justified without strong evidential support.

Keywords


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