What is Really Wrong with Ontic Structural Realism? On the Possibility of Reading off Ontology from Current Fundamental Science
Author :
Abstract
Epistemik ve Ontik Yapısal Gerçekçilik arasındaki temel ayrımın güncel temel bilimlerden ontoloji okunabilirliği ile alakalı olduğu iddia edilmektedir. Ontolojik bağlamda, yapıların nesnelere nazaran daha temel olduğu kabul edilse bile güncel temel bilimlerden ontoloji okumasının gerekçelendirilemeyeceği iddia edilmiştir. Ontik Yapısal Gerçekçilik argümanındaki güncel temel bilimlerden ontoloji okumasıyla ilgili sonucun öncüllerin birinde mevcut olduğu, dolayısıyla sonucun kanıtlanmış varsayıldığı gösterilmiştir. Sonuç olarak, karamsar indirgemeci argumanda ima edilen ontolojik süreksizlik problemine Ontik Yapısal Gerçekçilik’te değinilmemektedir.
Keywords
Abstract
I argue that the central conflict between epistemic and ontic versions of structural realism concerns whether it is possible to read off ontology from current fundamental science. Even if we assume that structures are metaphysically superior to objects, the possibility of reading off ontology from current fundamental science remains unjustified. I show that the conclusion as regards the reading off ontology in the ontic version is already assumed in one of the premises; hence the argument begs the question. As a result, the problem of ontological discontinuity implied in the pessimistic meta-induction argument remains intact in ontic structural realism.
Keywords
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